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The New Power 
of the Nominating Committee 
by SILAS S. CATHCART/Chairman, CEO, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. 
The nominat ing committee has emerged as a powerful force capable of determining cor-
porate direction. 
W h y has this happened? A number 
of key developments has recently 
changed the role of the board of 
directors, setting the stage for the 
emergence of the nominat ing com-
mittee. Some developments have 
been legislative, such as the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, w h i c h 
requires directors to oversee their 
companies more closely for possible 
illegal payments. Lawmakers such as 
Senator Howard Metzenbaum of 
O h i o even have talked about legislat-
ing standards of c o n d u c t for direc-
tors, and Ralph Nader has his Cor-
porate Democracy Act 
Regulatory actions, principal ly by 
the SEC, have had even greater 
impact, Pressure (or more participa-
tion on boards by outsiders and 
stepped up investigations of negli-
gence or misconduct by directors are 
two primary examples of SEC activity 
in this area 
Equally as important as regulatory 
and legislative pressures has been the 
litigation against directors by share-
holders. A national insurance broker-
age firm reports that the number of 
claims against corporate directors has 
increased 300 percent in the five 
years s ince the Penn Central cases 
were settled. O f the top 1,000 cor-
porations in the U.S., 95 percent now 
carry liability insurance for directors 
a n d officers Five years ago the figure 
was only 60 percent. 
Understandably, the c o m b i n e d 
effect of all these external inf luences 
has been to alter significantly the way 
boards funct ion and how board 
members v iew their jobs. O n e clear 
trend has been a greater involvement 
by outside directors. A recent study 
c o n d u c t e d by Korn/Ferry, an execu-
tive placement firm, indicates that, as 
of 1979, the average board consisted 
of four inside and nine outside direc-
tors. What's more, 75 percent of the 
directors surveyed felt that outsiders 
should outnumber insiders in the 
boardroom That represents a trend, 
incidentally, with w h i c h I agree. 
Indeed, I am conv inced that further 
legislative and regulatory restrictions 
on board members can be prevented 
only if we actively support the ap-
pointment of outside directors as a 
means of assuring an independent 
board. The corporate community ' s 
voluntary agreement to the cal l for 
greater board autonomy and in-
creased corporate governance is far 
more construct ive than w o u l d be 
increased governmental regulation It 
offers far greater benefit to business, 
to shareholders, and to the taxpay-
ing publ ic . 
A second trend, w h i c h is basical ly 
a response to the increased responsi-
bilities that a board must bear, is the 
emergence of the committee struc-
ture. A strong committee structure 
takes advantage of indiv idual exper-
tise, al lows more del iberation of 
issues apart from meetings of (he 
entire board, and permits better use 
of the board members' l imited time. 
The increased use of committees in 
and of itself, however, is not enough. 
Committees must be given specif ic 
and rather narrow charters, and we 
are seeing the first emergence of such 
duties as setting objectives, formu-
lating and approving strategies to 
achieve these objectives, evaluating 
overall performance, and selecting, 
motivating, even firing the chief 
executive officer. 
Probably the first committee to be 
used widely was the audit commit-
tee, w h i c h is usually c o m p o s e d of 
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outside directors only. This commit -
tee took on added s ignif icance with 
the N e w York Stock Exchange 
requirement of 1978. Other commit -
tees thai have emerged cover such 
areas as executive, budget, f inance, 
executive compensat ion, publ ic af-
fairs, and planning. 
The nominat ing committee is a rel-
ative n e w c o m e r to most boardrooms, 
at least in the format that it is taking 
today. Interest in the nominat ing 
committee, w h i c h really began in the 
early 1970's, grew tremendously by 
the end of the decade. In 1979, the 
previously cited survey of corporate 
boards found that 37 percent Were 
using the nominat ing committee as a 
standing committee, lust a year ear-
lier, the response was only 10 percent. 
In companies with sales over $'1 bil-
l ion, the 1979 rate was 50 percent, up 
signif icantly from the 38 percent just 
a year earlier. 
The same 1979 survey also showed 
that of the 50 percent not using nom-
inating committees, 16 percent, about 
a third, p lanned to establish a nomi-
nating committee within the next 
year. C o m p a n i e s w h i c h already had 
such committees, the study found, 
said they w o u l d use them more. 
These statistics indicate that the 
nominat ing committee is here to stay. 
The reason, it seems to me, is clear. 
Identifying and attracting quality out-
side directors—the committee's pri-
mary function—has never been more 
critical than it is today. I wi l l c o m e 
back to this important area, but first 
let me focus on the addit ional func-
tions of the nominat ing committee 
that m a n y people see emerging. 
O n e quest ion they raise about the 
nominat ing committee is whether it 
should be involved in the manage-
ment success ion process. The nomi-
nating committee screens candidates 
for the cha i rmanship or presidency, 
but, increasingly, it also examines 
candidates for other high-level man-
agement jobs. The general objective 
of the management succession 
process is to assure a smooth and 
timely transition when the need for 
new leadership arises. Some boards 
have c o n c l u d e d that this responsibi l-
ity fits naturally within the scope of 
the nominat ing committee. 
A related function of the nominat-
ing committee, some say, might be to 
monitor management performance 
and to recommend changes in man 
agement structure. Suggesting the 
appropriate size of the board cou ld 
be another. In addit ion, nominat ing 
committees increasingly are recom-
mending the funct ions of committees 
and determining their memberships. 
Finally, nominat ing committees are 
prescribing how frequently meetings 
should be held, as well as where— 
the corporate boardroom, a major 
manufactur ing facility, or, on occa-
s i o n s foreign location 
Now, these are all important factors 
that can determine the overall effec-
tiveness of a board, and they should 
be considered carefully. However, I 
take exception to the notion that a 
nominat ing committee should be 
chartered to do all of these functions. 
I believe that the nominat ing c o m 
mittee should be concerned with the 
selection of board members, the 
proper size of the board, the fre-
quency and location of meetings, the 
proper committee structure, and the 
membership of those committees. 
I do not believe that the duties and 
interests of the nominat ing commit-
tee should be focused on manage-
ment oversight, management succes-
sion, or management structure. These 
are very different issues and, it seems 
to me, should be the concern of 
either the board as a whole or—in 
keeping with my earlier remarks 
regarding narrow charters for com-
mittees— possibly the concern of a 
separate committee. If we were talk-
ing about a separate committee for 
oversight and succession, it most 
probably should be c o m p o s e d of 
board members w h o are C E O s from 
other companies , because people 
with the background and experience 
of a C E O are accustomed to and 
comfortable with selecting and man-
aging business people. This is their 
expertise. 
Let's take a look at the survey I 
mentioned earlier and at what it 
revealed about committee member-
ship. Typically, the nominat ing c o m 
mittee consists of seven members, 
four of w h o m are independent out-
side directors, inc luding a banker, 
legal counsel , or retired manager, and 
two of w h o m are inside directors, 
usually the chairman and president. 
Significantly, the survey found that 
37 percent of c o m p a n i e s with nom-
inating committees had no inside 
directors at all. 
In some cases, the board chairman 
is placed in charge of the nominat ing 
committee, but this approach has 
been debated. O p p o n e n t s c la im that 
the chairman's dual role tends to 
negate the objectivity ostensibly 
present in the committee and the 
transfer of authority. Proponents 
argue that the chairman should make 
suggestions to the committee and 
coordinate its activities. 
I side with the view that the mem-
bership of the nominat ing committee 
should be exclusively from the ranks 
of the outside directors. O n l y in this 
way can the charges against the C E O 
of stacking his board be neutralized. 
If the C E O is an ex off ic io member 
or participant, that is fine, but he 
should not be a member. 
Regardless of how the nominat ing 
committee is structured, its funda-
mental duty—finding new board 
member c a n d i d a t e s - i s getting a lot 
tougher. The Korn/Ferry survey of 
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corporate boards showed that more 
prospective directors turned d o w n 
otters to serve in 1979 than in any of 
the prior seven years. O f the firms 
surveyed, 13 percent had at least o n e 
candidate (urn them down, A wel l-
known, prestigious corporate name 
did not prevent this p h e n o m e n o n 
either. The 128 firms surveyed, w h i c h 
had sales over $1 bi l l ion, experienced 
a turndown rate that was three times 
that of 1978. 
The way the nominat ing c o m m i t -
tee goes about the critical job of 
selecting candidates and getting the 
acceptances of its future board 
members is a vita! assignment. The 
committee has to be sure that various 
constituencies are represented and 
yet do not upset the balance of view-
points on the board as a whole. As 
more minorities, academicians, and 
representatives of various social c o n -
cerns become board members, the 
manner in w h i c h the committee is 
structured—the nature, breadth, and 
objectivity of the candidates that 
satisfy these needs—will be critical 
to the future direction of the cor-
poration. 
What all this says to me is that the 
nominating committee is an increas-
ingly important part of the corporate 
world. At present, and hopeful ly in 
the future, it can be v iewed as a 
means by w h i c h the corporate wor ld 
can deal voluntari ly with some of the 
major crit icisms being leveled at it. 
In short, our boards are respond-
ing to the reasonable demands for 
accountabi l i ty from a variety of con-
stituencies. A n d the nominat ing 
committee's efforts to help the cor-
poration balance the needs of share-
holders, employees, and the c o m m u -
nity is squarely in the middle of this 
action. It is a tough and pivotal mid-
dle, in fact, and perhaps the fu lcrum 
on which wil l turn the corporation's 
future course of action. 
Notes from the Boardroom 
by R O D E R I C K M . HILLS/Former Chairman, SEC 
The following excerpts are from a 
presentation m a d e at a Houston 
directors' seminar by Mr. Hills, a 
partner in the law firm of Latham, 
Watkins & Hills. 
Ifirst joined a c o m p a n y that had directors and stockholders back in 
1960. It was a small electronics c o m -
pany, and as I walked into the room, I 
saw an older gent leman sitting at the 
table. He was obv ious ly a veteran of 
these meetings, and I said to h im, 
kind of shyly, "What is it that we're 
supposed to decide here?" He said, 
"Well, Sonny, you c o m e into each 
board meeting, and you just ask 
yourself o n e quest ion: Should we fire 
the boss? If the answer turns out to 
be no, just keep your mouth shut, 
and smile a lot." 
Today, we're asked by the law to 
make a lot more decis ions. But I ser-
iously question whether any of these 
mandated decis ions are helpful to 
the primary mission of directors, 
w h i c h should be the corporation's 
productivity and profitability. 
As a director, it is my responsibi l ity 
to k n o w what the other directors 
bring to the table Is there sufficient 
experience in the group to provide an 
overview for this c o m p a n y ? By rea-
son of background, training, knowl-
edge, intel l igence, does this group 
have the m i n i m u m ability needed to 
judge the business? I didn't choose 
them. Probably the president did. But 
isn't it my responsibility, the board's 
responsibility, to look around each 
year and decide? A n d that evaluation 
should be done, it seems to me, 
before the old slate is renominated 
just on the grounds that we all play 
golf together a c o u p l e of times a year. 
O n e day some judge is go ing to 
proclaim in a learned op in ion 
whether or not a board has a suffi-
ciently independent character to 
make the decis ions a board needs to 
make. If he's my k ind of judge, he 
won't m u c h care whether there is a 
given number of outside directors 
and so many inside directors. He 
won't very m u c h care whether there 
is a nominat ing committee or what 
the board's structure is. W h a t wi l l 
matter is that there is real indepen-
dence, and thai it is being exercised 
to decide whether to reject a tend-
er offer, to go private, or 1o approve 
a company 's pric ing mechanism. 
Rather than have the S E C tell us 
how directors should act, the courts 
can cause this standard of indepen-
dence to evolve, based o n practical 
experience and proper corporate 
performance. T h e judic ia l role—so 
played—will be to bring the more 
deficient c o m p a n i e s up to that stan-
dard. That, after all, is how the c o m -
m o n law evolved in [his nation & 
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